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I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2005, Marlyn Riley suffered a heart attack resulting
from a blood clot that had formed at the site of a stent, a small
mesh tube surgically implanted in one of his coronary arteries to
1
open the artery and improve blood flow.
The stent was
manufactured by Cordis, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, and
had been approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) after a comprehensive and rigorous review for safety and
†
1.

Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (D. Minn. 2009).
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efficacy by that agency that led to approval for marketing the device
on April 24, 2003, about a week before it was implanted in Mr.
2
Riley. Riley sued Cordis for the injuries that he had suffered as a
result of the heart attack. The complaint, filed in federal district
court in Minnesota, alleged “just about every conceivable legal
theory,” including allegations of negligence and negligence per se,
strict liability for design defect and for failure to warn, breach of
express and implied warranties, negligent misrepresentation, and
3
fraud. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings,
arguing that Riley’s claims were preempted by provisions of the
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA), including the 1976
4
Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to that act. Riley argued in
response that his state law claims were not preempted because they
merely paralleled federal law and would not impose requirements
on the defendants that were different from or in addition to those
5
imposed by federal law. The court dismissed all claims, finding
them to be either expressly or impliedly preempted, or not pled
with sufficient specificity so that the court could determine whether
6
they were preempted.
In its analysis, the Riley court referred to the U.S. Supreme
7
Court’s preemption decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., which
explained that in order to escape the express preemption clause,
added at 21 U.S.C 360k(a) by the MDA, a state-law claim must be
premised on the breach of a duty that is the same as the duty
8
imposed under the FDCA or one of its implementing regulations.
“Put differently,” the Riley court said, “the conduct that is alleged to
give the plaintiff a right to recover under state law must be conduct
9
that is forbidden by the FDCA.”
However, that is not the end of the inquiry. Even if a claim
escapes express preemption, it may be impliedly preempted in light
of Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, a case in which the
2. Id. at 773–75.
3. Id. at 780 n.5. The court described the complaint as “the quintessential
‘kitchen-sink’ complaint, in which he has thrown just about every conceivable legal
theory up against the wall—sometimes over and over again—in the hope that
something will stick.” Id. The court concluded that the complaint “manage[d] to
be both prolix and uninformative.” Id. at 787.
4. Id. at 773.
5. Id. at 781.
6. Id. at 773.
7. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
8. Id. at 330.
9. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
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Supreme Court held that a private litigant cannot sue a defendant
for violating the FDCA because enforcement of that act is
10
exclusively the province of the FDA. Nor can a private litigant
bring a state-law claim when the substance of that claim is for
violating the FDCA—“that is, when the state claim would not exist
11
if the FDCA did not exist.”
In conclusion, the Riley court said that
Riegel and Buckman create a narrow gap through which a
plaintiff’s state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express
or implied preemption. The plaintiff must be suing for
conduct that violates the FDCA (or else his claim is
expressly preempted by § 360k(a)), but the plaintiff must
not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such
a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman).
For a state-law claim to survive, then, the claim must be
premised on conduct that both (1) violates the FDCA and
(2) would give rise to a recovery under state law even in
12
the absence of the FDCA.
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs’ lawyers have seized on the concept
of an un-preempted “parallel” state-law claim in order to avoid the
preemptive effects of Riegel, generating a considerable amount of
case law addressing the question: What is a parallel claim? By
eliminating plaintiffs’ ability to challenge most product design and
warning decisions made by the manufacturers of PMA devices,
Riegel has encouraged more suits focusing on whether
manufacturers violated FDA regulations, failed to follow the
manufacturing processes approved by the FDA, withheld data on
safety and effectiveness in order to secure premarket approval, or
withheld data in violation of post-approval reporting requirements.
And in light of Buckman, plaintiffs must also ask, which of these
parallel claims are preempted? The surviving claims must avoid
both express and implied preemption, fitting within the “narrow
13
gap” between the two, which was first described by the Riley court.
This article will analyze the issues raised by these cases and first
attempt to extract from them the characteristics of a state-law claim
that merely parallels federal law—and is thus not expressly
10. 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001). 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006) provides that
“all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter
shall be by and in the name of the United States.”
11. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
12. Id. at 777.
13. Id.
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preempted—from those state-law claims that are preempted
because they impose on the defendant a requirement that is
14
“different from, or in addition to” federal requirements.
This
discussion will show that an important unsettled question in the
express preemption cases is the question of how specific the
applicable federal law or regulation must be to amount to a
15
“requirement.” The answer to this question determines whether
the scope of express preemption under the MDA is broad or
narrow. Second, the article will analyze the implied preemption
cases in an attempt to identify the features of those cases in which
the plaintiff is suing for a device manufacturer’s conduct that
violates the FDCA, but is not suing because the conduct violates the
16
FDCA. This part of the discussion will show that there also are
conflicting views about the scope—whether broad or narrow—of
the implied preemptive effect of the federal law. Those conflicting
views are reflected in the courts’ answers to the question of whether
a state-law claim is impliedly preempted only when it amounts to a
fraud-on-the-FDA claim, or more broadly whenever it is a private
action that, in effect, enforces a violation of an FDA requirement.
Finally, the article will explore the struggle faced in many
instances at the pleading stage by plaintiffs attempting to craft their
17
complaint so as to avoid dismissal on the pleadings.
II. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of preemption derives from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that the
laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
18
Contrary notwithstanding.”
Thus, “state law that conflicts with
19
Congress may preempt state law
federal law is ‘without effect.’”
in three ways: “State action may be foreclosed by express language
in a congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and
breadth of a congressional scheme that occupies the legislative
14. Id. at 775 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 777.
17. See, e.g., Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(plaintiffs’ initial complaint dismissed; “starkly different” amended complaint then
filed).
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
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field, or by implication because of a conflict with a congressional
20
enactment.”
For preemption purposes, “state law” includes not only
statutes, regulations, and executive pronouncements, but also
21
common law.
State regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive
relief.
State-law causes of action must give way when such claims
encroach on the objectives that Congress has addressed directly or
22
indirectly through federal statutes or administrative regulations.
Thus, “[c]entral to determining questions of preemption is
23
divining Congress’ intent.”
In the last two decades the United States Supreme Court has
created a complex body of law surrounding preemption, beginning
24
in 1992 with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which established
preemption as a major defense in the field of product liability
litigation. Three of the Court’s most influential exercises in
25
preemption analysis, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, Buckman Co. v.
26
27
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. arose in the
context of product liability claims involving medical devices.
III. THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS FOR MEDICAL DEVICES
Understanding and applying these Supreme Court decisions,
as well as the wealth of lower court decisions interpreting them,
requires an understanding of both the complex regulatory scheme
28
created by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the

20. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citations
omitted).
21. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008); Midwest
Motor Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 881, 887–89
(Minn. 1994).
22. See, e.g., Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513, 520–29 (holding failure to warn claims
preempted by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which provides that no
statements relating to smoking and health, other than statements required by the
Act, “shall be required on any cigarette package”).
23. Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517–18).
24. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
25. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
26. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
27. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
28. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)). See generally Buckman, 531 U.S. at 344.
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29

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the statute under which
the FDA regulates prescription drugs and medical devices, and the
enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The statute has both express
and implied preemptive effects on state-law-based causes of action.
The approval process for medical devices differs significantly
depending upon a device’s classification under the law. The MDA
divides medical devices into three categories, each with separate
30
regulations relating to approval. Class I medical devices pose no
unreasonable risk of illness or injury and are subject to only
31
minimal regulation by “general controls.” Class II devices, which
are more complex and pose greater potential health risks than
32
Class I devices, are subject to more extensive “special controls.”
The most extensive regulation involves Class III devices, which
present “a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury” or are
“purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or
sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial
33
importance in preventing impairment of human health.” Because
of their potential risks, Class III medical devices are subject to an
involved premarket approval (PMA) process within the FDA before
they may be marketed. The PMA process requires the applicant to
demonstrate “a ‘reasonable assurance’ that the device is both
‘safe . . . [and] effective under the conditions of use prescribed,
34
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.’”
During the PMA process, manufacturers must present the FDA
with full reports of all studies that have been published or should
reasonably be known to the manufacturer; a full description of the
device’s components, ingredients, and properties, and principles of
operation; a full description of the methods and facilities for

29. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 331–397 (2006)).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)–(C).
31. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A). Examples of Class I devices include bed boards and
tongue depressors. 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6070, .6230. To learn the classification of a
medical device and its FDA approval status, consult http://www.fda.gov
/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Consumers/ucm142523.htm.
32. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). Examples of Class II devices include oxygen
masks, tampons, and syringes. 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.5860, 868.5655, 884.5460.
33. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). Examples of Class III devices include hip and
knee replacement components, intraocular lenses, and pacemakers. See, e.g., 21
C.F.R. § 870.3610.
34. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2)(A)–(B) (1994)); see also
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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manufacturing, processing, and packaging of the device; samples,
or device components required by the FDA; and an example of the
35
proposed labeling.
The FDA also may refer the device to an
36
outside panel of experts and may ask the manufacturer for
additional information before deciding whether to grant
37
approval. PMA of a device may be conditioned on adherence to
38
various requirements.
However, Class III devices that fall within one of three
recognized exceptions are exempt from the time-consuming PMA
39
process.
One exception allows for “grandfathered” devices
40
manufactured prior to MDA enactment to remain on the market.
A second exception allows a manufacturer to show that its product
is “substantially equivalent” to devices in existence in 1976 so that
approval can be expedited through what is known as “premarket
41
notification” or the “§ 510(k) process.” A substantial proportion
of Class III device approvals are made under this expedited
42
§ 510(k) review process that focuses not on the device’s safety and
efficacy, but on its equivalency to an already approved device. And
finally, a third exception is the investigational device exemption, or
“IDE,” which applies to experimental technology and allows for
unapproved devices to be used in research trials involving human
43
subjects. The purpose of IDE approval is “to encourage . . . the
35. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1).
36. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2012).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(H) (Supp. 2011).
38. Id. §§ 360e(d)(1)(B)(ii), 360j(e)(1) (2006). For example, the device
may be restricted to use in patients who do not have certain medical conditions.
Id. § 360j(e)(1).
39. PMA review is estimated to consume approximately 1200 hours of FDA
time. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 318 (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
41. Id. § 360e(b)(1)(B); Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 221 (6th Cir.
2000) (noting that “premarket notification” is referred to as “the § 510(k) process”
and that this limited form of review “averages only 20 hours of review as opposed
to some 1200 hours in the PMA process”).
42. The majority of Class III devices submitted for FDA consideration—
hundreds each year—are variants on products like standard pacemakers that were
already in the market when the MDA was enacted in 1976. Only about twenty to
fifty new PMA applications are reviewed in a typical year. Barnaby J. Feder, Medical
Device Ruling Redraws Lines on Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/22device.html.
“In 2005, for
example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under § 510(k) and
granted premarket approval to just 32 devices.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317 (citing P.
HUTT, R. MERRILL & L. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed. 2007)).
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(a), 360j(g). An IDE permits a manufacturer to market
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discovery and development of useful devices intended for human
use and to that end to maintain optimum freedom for scientific
44
investigators in their pursuit of that purpose.”
IDE approval
permits a device to be used in a clinical setting to gather data for a
45
PMA.
Approval by the FDA of a device for marketing does not end
the regulatory process, however. After a device is approved, the
MDA forbids any changes in the design of the device, its
manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other aspect of the
device that would affect safety or efficacy without first filing a
supplemental PMA application and obtaining the FDA’s approval
46
of the change. These supplemental applications are “evaluated
47
under largely the same criteria as an initial application.”
A medical device manufacturer must also comply with post48
approval reporting requirements.
These requirements include
the submission of reports from clinical investigations or studies
involving the device of which the manufacturer knows or should
49
know, and reports of incidents in which the device “[m]ay have
caused or contributed to a death or serious injury” or has
malfunctioned and “would be likely to cause or contribute to a
50
death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to recur.” The
FDA has the power to withdraw approval of the device based on
newly reported information or existing data and must withdraw its
approval if it determines that a device is unsafe or ineffective under
51
the conditions in its labeling. The agency also has the authority to
52
order a labeling change based on newly acquired information and
the power to require the manufacturer to notify all affected
individuals, or require repair or replacement of a device if it
concludes that the device “presents an unreasonable risk of
53
substantial harm to the public.”
“a device that otherwise would be required to comply with a performance standard
or to have premarket approval to be shipped lawfully for the purpose of
conducting investigations of that device.” 21 C.F.R. § 812.1 (2012).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1).
45. Id. § 360j(g)(2)–(3).
46. Id. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a).
47. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2006 & Supp. 2011).
49. 21 C.F.R. § 814.84(b)(2).
50. Id. § 803.50(a).
51. 21 U.S.C §§ 360e(e)(1), 360h(e) (2006); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319–20.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 360f(a)(2).
53. Id. § 360h.
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All medical devices, not just Class III devices, must comply with
the FDA’s current good manufacturing practices (CGMP)
54
regulations, which set forth a quality control system and “govern
the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the
design, manufacture, packaging, labeling, storage, installation, and
55
servicing of all finished devices intended for human use.” The
manufacturer must adopt procedures and controls relating to
product design and manufacturing, quality assurance, and
corrective or preventive action, but the CGMP requirements “leave
it up to the manufacturer to institute a quality control system
specific to the medical device it produces to ensure that such
56
device is safe and effective.”
Finally, the FDCA limits the power to enforce the act to the
FDA and to the States. Section 337 of the act provides that, except
for the power granted to States to sue in their own name for
violations of the act, “all . . . proceedings for the enforcement, or to
restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of
57
the United States.” This provision is meant to preclude private
enforcement of the act. “Congress has determined that there
should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation [of
58
the FDCA].”
IV. EXPRESS PREEMPTION UNDER THE MDA—LOHR AND RIEGEL
In addition to its many procedural requirements, the MDA
also contains an express preemption provision:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish
or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
54. Id. § 360j(f); 21 C.F.R. § 820.1–.250.
55. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1(a)(1).
56. Horowitz v. Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
Because the regulation must apply to so many different types of devices,
the regulation does not prescribe in detail how a manufacturer must
produce a specific device. Rather, the regulation provides the framework
that all manufacturers must follow by requiring that manufacturers
develop and follow procedures and fill in the details that are appropriate
to a given device according to the current state-of-the-art manufacturing
for that specific device.
Quality
System
(QS)
Regulation/Medical
Device
Good
Manufacturing
Practices,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov
/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements
/qualitysystemsregulations/default.htm (last updated Apr. 28, 2011).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a).
58. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
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human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device,
and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a requirement
59
applicable to the device under this chapter.
Under the FDA’s interpretive regulations, “any requirement” by a
state includes any court decision that “is different from, or in
addition to, any requirement applicable to such device under any
provision of the act and which relates to the safety or effectiveness
60
of the device.” However, such “[s]tate or local requirements are
preempted only when the [FDA] has established specific
counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements
61
applicable to a particular device.”
The United States Supreme Court first addressed whether the
MDA preempts certain common law products liability claims in
62
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. The plaintiff in the case, Lora Lohr, was
“dependent on pacemaker technology for the proper functioning
63
of her heart.” She required emergency heart surgery when her
pacemaker failed, allegedly as the result of a defective lead, the part
of the device that “transmits the heartbeat-steadying electrical
64
signal from the ‘pulse generator’ to the heart itself.”
The
65
pacemaker lead was manufactured by Medtronic. It was a Class III
device approved by the FDA under section 510(k) of the MDA after
having been found “‘substantially equivalent to devices introduced
66
into interstate commerce’ prior to the effective date of the Act.”
In its approval letter to the manufacturer, the agency emphasized
that its “determination should not be construed as an endorsement
67
of the pacemaker lead’s safety.” Lohr and her husband filed suit
in a Florida state court against Medtronic, which removed the case
to federal district court and filed a motion for summary judgment,
59. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
60. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b).
61. Id. § 808.1(d). These interpretive regulations reflect the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) discussed infra in
notes 72–86 and accompanying text.
62. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
63. Id. at 480.
64. Id. at 480–81.
65. Id. at 480.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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arguing that Lohr’s claims for negligence and strict liability were
68
preempted under § 360k(a) of the MDA.
In its decision, the Court in Lohr held that claims arising from
alleged defects in a pacemaker lead, a Class III device that had
been approved under the section 510(k) notification process as
“substantially equivalent” to an already-approved device, were not
preempted by the MDA’s express preemption provision because
the FDA had not reviewed the device for safety and effectiveness
but only had determined that it satisfied the law’s equivalency
69
standard.
State law regulating the device’s safety did not,
therefore, conflict with any FDA safety determinations. However,
the Court also said that even if there were FDA-established safety
standards applying to a device, “[n]othing in § 360k denies [the
state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for
violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal
70
requirements.” The Lohr court’s conclusion that a “parallel” claim
is not expressly preempted was confirmed more than a decade later
71
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
In 1996, Charles Riegel underwent an angioplasty to dilate his
72
coronary artery. During an angioplasty, a balloon catheter is used
by a physician to open patients’ clogged arteries, essentially by
inserting the catheter into the clogged artery, inflating it like a
73
balloon, and then deflating and removing the catheter. During
Riegel’s procedure, his doctor inserted an Evergreen Balloon
Catheter, manufactured by Medtronic, into Riegel’s artery and
inflated the device several times, up to a pressure of ten
74
atmospheres.
On the final inflation, the catheter burst, and
75
Riegel began to rapidly deteriorate. He developed a complete
heart block, lost consciousness, was intubated and placed on
advanced life support, and was rushed to the operating room for

68. Id. at 481.
69. Id. at 495.
70. Id.
71. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
72. Id. at 320.
73. Id.
74. The warning label stated that the Evergreen catheter was contraindicated
for use in patients with coronary artery disease like Riegel’s and also warned that it
should not be inflated beyond its rated burst pressure of eight atmospheres.
Despite these label warnings, Riegel’s doctor chose to use this device in this way.
Id.
75. Id.
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76

emergency coronary bypass surgery. Riegel survived, but suffered
77
The FDA had
severe injuries and permanent disabilities.
approved Medtronic’s PMA for the Evergreen Balloon Catheter in
1994 and had subsequently approved Medtronic’s PMA
supplements, which requested approval for revised labeling for the
78
device.
Riegel and his wife sued Medtronic, alleging that the catheter
was designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner that violated
79
state common law and that these defects caused Riegel’s injuries.
The complaint raised a number of state common law claims that
were dismissed by the federal district court, which held that the
claims were preempted under the MDA, a result affirmed on
80
appeal by the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the MDA
preemption clause does bar common-law tort claims challenging
the safety or effectiveness of a PMA-approved medical device, such
as the balloon catheter involved in Riegel, that has undergone the
81
full-blown “rigorous” FDA premarket approval process.
“Generalized common law theories of liability . . . are precisely the
82
types of claims the MDA sought to preempt.” The court affirmed
the view taken in earlier preemption cases that conflicting state law
“requirements” may take the form of common-law duties,
explaining that common-law liability is premised on the existence
of a legal duty—a state-law obligation—and that a tort judgment for
damages can be “a potent method of governing conduct and
83
controlling policy.” However, the court also said that state law
requirements are preempted only if they are “different from, or in
84
addition to” federal requirements, affirming Lohr on this point.
Such claims are not preempted if the state-imposed duties merely

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 320–21.
81. Id. at 317–18, 323 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477
(1996)).
82. Williams v. Cyberonics, Inc., 388 F. App’x 169, 171 (3rd Cir. 2010) (citing
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325).
83. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 521 (1992)).
84. Id. at 312 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)); see also Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow
Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011).
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“‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.” Therefore,
in order to determine whether a particular claim is preempted, a
court must “look through the general duties imposed by the statelaw causes of action and consider the effect a successful lawsuit
asserting those causes of action would have and determine whether
86
they threaten the federal PMA process requirements.”
Typical design defect and failure to warn claims, whether
brought as strict liability or negligence claims, essentially challenge
the design or warning choice made by the manufacturer. But PMA
approval of a Class III device includes specific FDA examination
and approval of a device’s design and accompanying label
87
warnings.
Therefore, a state-law-based determination that a
device was defectively designed or was not accompanied by an
adequate warning would be in direct conflict with the FDA’s prior
determination to the contrary. For example, in Clark v. Medtronic,
88
Inc., the plaintiff, who had received an implantable cardiac
defibrillator (ICD) to treat a heart arrhythmia, experienced
“inappropriate shocks” from the device and eventually had it
89
replaced with a different ICD. He brought several state-law claims
including claims for negligent design and negligently failing to
90
warn of the shock risk. The federal district court ruled that all of
91
his claims were preempted. Clark relied on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor for the proposition that, if the manufacturer had fully
complied with FDA requirements, he would not have experienced
problems with the device and that, therefore, the device must not
have been manufactured in accordance with the FDA’s premarket
92
approval requirements. But the court pointed out that an ICD is a
complex device that “can fail for a variety of reasons, including
medical complications, body rejection phenomena, allergic
reaction, and surgical techniques, all of which occur without
93
someone acting in a negligent manner.”
Premarket approval,
based upon the FDA’s balancing of a device’s benefits as well as
85. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
86. Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 929–30 (5th Cir.
2006).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2006) (listing PMA application requirements).
88. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Minn. 2008).
89. Id. at 1092.
90. Id. at 1093.
91. Id. at 1095.
92. Id. at 1094–95.
93. Id. at 1094 (quoting Mozes v. Medtronic, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129
(D. Minn. 1998)).
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risks, does not guarantee that an approved device is completely
94
safe. The FDA approved warnings about this shock risk when it
95
approved the device and, therefore, the plaintiff’s claim, that the
device did not comply with federal requirements simply because it
had caused an inappropriate shock, would impose a state-law
96
requirement in addition to the federal requirements.
Such claims also sometimes come in the guise of a claim for
97
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, but again, if
the alleged reason that the product is unmerchantable is because
of some aspect of its design or warnings, the claim directly conflicts
with prior FDA approval of the adequacy of the device’s design and
labeling and is thus preempted. Similarly, if a breach of express
98
warranty claim is based on the device’s label, it, too, is preempted.
In the typical manufacturing defect case, however, the essence
of the claim is that the device was not made the way it was supposed
to be made according to its design. Therefore, a state-law-based
determination of a manufacturing defect does not necessarily
conflict with the FDA’s approval of the device’s design for the
simple reason that the device was not made according to its design
as required by federal law. The state and federal claims may be
equivalent. For example, a claim that a device contains a
manufacturing defect because it violates FDA requirements for
manufacturing quality control may be an un-preempted parallel
99
claim.
The state-law requirement of a non-defective product
would be the equivalent of the federal-law requirement that a
device be manufactured in conformance with federal regulations
designed to assure a device’s manufacturing quality.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id.
See 27 MICHAEL K. STEENSON, J. DAVID PRINCE & SARAH L. BREW,
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.14 (2006).
98. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 787 (D. Minn. 2009).
99. As discussed infra in Part IX in greater detail, an important issue in such
cases, and one of the great divides among the lower federal courts’ resolution of
this issue, is just how detailed the FDA’s regulatory requirements for the device
must be in order to be regarded as a “requirement.” Compare Bausch v. Stryker
Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 554–556 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the FDA’s Quality
Control Regulations and CGMP are sufficiently specific to be regarded as a
“requirement”), with In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig.
(Sprint Fidelis Leads II), 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding to the contrary).
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V. IMPLIED PREEMPTION UNDER THE FDCA—BUCKMAN
Even if a product defect claim against a medical device
manufacturer is not expressly preempted because it parallels
federal law, it may nonetheless be impliedly preempted. After Lohr,
some courts concluded that state common-law fraud-on-the-FDA
claims were not preempted when FDA approval of a drug or
medical device was secured through the manufacturer’s material
misrepresentations or omissions to the FDA during the approval
100
process.
If the FDA’s approval had been obtained by
misrepresentation, then the agency’s safety determination as to the
device should not be regarded as a legitimate federal requirement
with which state law might conflict. The United States Supreme
Court examined this issue, again addressing preemption in the
101
context of the MDA, in Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.
In
Buckman, plaintiffs injured by orthopedic bone screws brought suit
alleging that the defendant, a regulatory consultant, had made
fraudulent representations to the FDA in order to obtain approval
102
to market the devices. The manufacturer was responsible for the
103
design of the bone screws, but was not a defendant here. Instead,
the consultant was sued for the manner in which the application
104
As in Lohr,
for the device’s approval was presented to the FDA.
the device had been approved through the less rigorous § 510(k)
105
process.
But unlike the Lohr Court, the Buckman Court, without
any explanation, declined to address whether the express
preemption provision of § 360k applied and instead undertook an
implied preemption analysis, holding that the plaintiffs’ fraud-on106
the-FDA claims were preempted.
The court explained that the
§ 510(k) process created a “comprehensive scheme” for
100. See, e.g., Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that state fraud-on-the-FDA claims were not preempted because
the FDA’s approval imposed no specific “requirement” on a device that could
conflict with state law).
101. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
102. Id. at 343.
103. See Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the
Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 572 (2002). The
manufacturer, AcroMed, was also sued, but AcroMed was dismissed pursuant to a
global settlement. Id. Fraud-on-the-FDA was the only claim against the regulatory
consultant. Id.
104. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343.
105. Id. at 346.
106. Id. at 348 n.2 (expressing “no view on whether these claims [were]
subject to express pre-emption under 21 U.S.C. § 360k”).
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determining whether to approve a device under the “substantially
107
That scheme establishes exactly what a
equivalent” standard.
manufacturer must submit to the FDA and empowers the FDA to
108
demand further information. Most significantly, the FDA itself is
charged with policing fraud in connection with manufacturers’
submissions and has a variety of enforcement options that allow it
109
to make “a measured response to suspected fraud.”
The Court
said that “[t]he FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal
Government rather than private litigants who are authorized to file
110
suit for noncompliance with the medical device provisions.”
Therefore, permitting the plaintiffs’ state fraud claims would
conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud in accordance
111
with its own judgment and objectives under the FDCA.
For that reason, a unanimous Court concluded that allowing
state fraud-on-the-FDA claims would “exert an extraneous pull on
112
the scheme established by Congress.”
The Court explained that
“[a]s a practical matter, complying with the FDA’s detailed
regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States’ tort regimes [would]
113
dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants.”
Consequently, medical device manufacturers might decline to
develop or submit potentially beneficial devices for FDA approval
out of fear that they might be exposed to “unpredictable civil
liability,” thereby defeating the federal goal of ensuring the
114
availability of efficacious medical devices.
The court concluded
that state fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with the federal medical
device regime established by Congress and are therefore
115
preempted.
In so finding, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished
fraud-on-the-FDA claims from other state tort claims for inadequate
labeling, such as those the Court had previously addressed in Lohr:
“[A]lthough [Lohr] can be read to allow certain state-law causes of
actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and
cannot stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 348.
See id.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 349 n.4.
Id. at 350–51.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 348.
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116

support a state-law claim.”
The critical distinction between Lohr
and Buckman is the fundamental difference in the source of the
cause of action. In Lohr, the cause of action was based in
traditional state tort law and pre-existed the FDCA. In Buckman, on
the other hand, the fraud-on-the-FDA claim was premised entirely
117
on the federal regulatory scheme created by the FDA.
This
distinction may explain why the court opted to forego an express
preemption analysis, which focuses on state statutory and common
law “requirements,” and to rely instead upon a conflict preemption
theory, which is clearly implicated when the objectives and
operation of a congressional regulatory scheme are threatened.
VI. THE “NARROW GAP”
As indicated at the outset, a state-law-based product liability
claim against a Class III medical device manufacturer faces
significant hurdles to fit within the “narrow gap” so aptly described
118
in Riley. The claim may be expressly preempted because it would
effectively impose upon the manufacturer a requirement that is
different from or in addition to the requirements imposed upon
the manufacturer by the FDA under federal law. According to Lohr
and Riegel, that is especially likely to be the case if the device has
undergone a full PMA review in order to obtain FDA approval for
marketing. And if it is not expressly preempted, it may, according
to Buckman, nevertheless be impliedly preempted because
recognition of the state-law claim would “exert an extraneous pull
119
on the scheme established by Congress.”
In order to survive
dismissal, the claims must avoid both express and implied
preemption.
In determining whether a state-law claim is
preempted, several key questions must be answered.
VII. WHAT IS A “PARALLEL” CLAIM?
Riegel makes clear that state-law-based claims are expressly
preempted only if they impose requirements that are “different
from, or in addition to” federal requirements, but are not
preempted if the state-imposed duties merely “‘parallel,’ rather
116. Id. at 353.
117. See id. at 347 (“Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field
which the States have traditionally occupied’ . . . .”).
118. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009).
119. 531 U.S. at 353.
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120

than add to, federal requirements.” This brief description of the
claims that survive express preemption is sufficiently vague to have
resulted in varying interpretations by courts seeking to implement
121
the Riegel ruling.
While many cases have raised the issue of
whether a state-law claim merely parallels federal requirements
applicable to a medical device, they are inconsistent in their
outcomes and are not entirely clear about whether there is a core
test for parallelism. In particular, there is a split of authority
among the federal circuits as to whether the state-law claim must be
parallel to a federal requirement specific to the device in question
or whether it must be parallel only to a more general, industry-wide
requirement.
So what makes a state-law claim “parallel” to a federal-law claim
and just how “parallel” must the state and federal requirements be?
VIII. WHAT IS A FEDERAL “REQUIREMENT”?
“In order for a state requirement to be parallel to a federal
requirement . . . the plaintiff must show that the requirements are
‘genuinely equivalent.’ State and federal requirements are not
genuinely equivalent if a manufacturer could be held liable under
122
the state law without having violated the federal law.”
Thus, a
state-law claim must be premised on the breach of a duty that is the
same as the duty imposed under the FDCA or one of its
123
implementing regulations.
Genuine equivalency, therefore, first requires that there be a
124
federal requirement applicable to the device.
In Walker v.
125
Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff sued, alleging that an implanted pain
medication pump manufactured by the defendant caused the
death of her husband when it infused a fatal overdose of

120. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
121. See Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The
contours of the parallel claim exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet
ill-defined.”).
122. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005)).
123. See Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
124. See, e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir.
2011) (“Parallel claims must . . . specifically . . . allege that ‘[the] defendant
violated a particular federal specification referring to the device at issue.’”
(quoting Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
125. 670 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 162 (2012).
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126

medication into her husband’s system.
The FDA had approved
this PMA device designed with a certain flow rate and a delivery
accuracy of plus or minus fifteen percent, but had not set a formal
performance standard requiring that the pump always remain
127
within that range.
Indeed, warnings accompanying the device
said that the pump’s flow characteristics could change over time
128
and possibly result in a drug overdose.
Walker argued that her
complaint stated an un-preempted parallel claim when she alleged
that the pump had failed to adhere to the plus or minus fifteen
129
percent specification.
However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
130
district court’s dismissal of the claim on preemption grounds.
The court explained that because the FDA had not established for
the device a formal performance standard requiring that the device
always remain within fifteen percent of its designed flow rate, there
131
was no binding federal requirement that the device do so. Thus,
a failure to remain within those parameters was not a violation of
132
an FDA requirement.
Even where federal law permits a device manufacturer to act in
a particular way, that permission does not impose a federal
“requirement.” For example, in McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., the
plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of a tremor control device
133
implanted in the brain of a patient with Parkinson’s disease.
As
part of its approval of this Class III device, the FDA required
Medtronic to maintain contact information for patients implanted
with the device and also required specific warnings regarding
“electrocautery” and “diathermy” that were provided in the
134
manuals for physicians and patients.
Electrocautery is the
burning or searing of tissue caused by an electrically heated
135
Diathermy is the localized heating of tissue for
instrument.
therapeutic purposes by means of passing an electric current
136
through the tissue. After McMullen had been implanted with two
of these devices in May of 2000, one on each side of his brain, he
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 578.
See id. at 577–78.
421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 485 n.1.
Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2

2013]

PUZZLE OF PARALLEL CLAIMS

1053

experienced considerable improvement in his Parkinson’s
137
symptoms. However, after a visit in March 2001 to his dentist for
a treatment that possibly involved diathermy or electrocautery, he
experienced a decline in the control of his Parkinson’s symptoms,
which continued despite further surgeries to replace components
138
of the implanted devices.
In January 2001, in the wake of an
anecdotal report of brain injury to a Parkinson’s patient after a
dental treatment that involved the use of diathermy, Medtronic
began an investigation that resulted in the sending of warning
letters, in May 2001, to patients implanted with the device and their
139
The letters specifically warned against diathermy
doctors.
treatment, saying that it “can cause tissue damage and can result in
140
severe injury or death.”
McMullen and his wife sued, alleging that Medtronic had
breached its postsale duty to warn of the risks associated with
141
diathermy treatment.
Their claim was dismissed by the district
court on preemption grounds, a result affirmed on appeal by the
142
Seventh Circuit.
The key issue was whether Medtronic was
required by federal law to provide an additional warning between
January 2001, when Medtronic learned of the anecdotal report,
and March 2001, when McMullen underwent the dental procedure
143
and was injured.
In order to change the warnings for an approved Class III
144
device, a manufacturer must first obtain the FDA’s approval but is
permitted to temporarily amend a warning pending FDA approval
145
of the requested change. The court concluded that because this
regulation simply allowed but did not require a warning change
prior to FDA approval it did not amount to a federal requirement:
“Where a federal requirement permits a course of conduct and the
state makes it obligatory, the state’s requirement is in addition to
146
the federal requirement and thus is preempted.”
147
In Heisner v. Genzyme Corp., the plaintiff’s wife died as a result
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 485.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 486, 490.
Id. at 486–87.
See 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a) (2012).
21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(2)(i).
McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489.
No. 08-C-593, 2010 WL 894054 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2010).
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of an allergic reaction to a chemical in a film barrier designed to
148
The barrier was a Class III
prevent postsurgical adhesions.
medical device approved pursuant to the PMA process and
149
manufactured by the defendant.
Her husband sued, claiming
that the manufacturer violated a state common-law duty to update
the device’s warning label upon acquiring information about the
dangerous nature of the synthesized acid in the product that
150
caused the fatal allergic reaction. But the court found that, even
though the manufacturer could have temporarily updated its label
while awaiting FDA approval of the change, there was no MDA
requirement that the manufacturer amend its label to provide a
151
warning of a potential allergic reaction.
The court concluded
that the claim was preempted because there was no federal duty
“‘genuinely equivalent’ to the duty that Plaintiff claims exists under
152
state common law.”
IX. GENERAL OR DEVICE-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT?
The most important unresolved issue in determining whether
there is a federal “requirement” applicable to a medical device is
whether the FDA’s regulatory requirements must be specifically
applicable to the device in question or may be a more generally
applicable requirement applying to entire categories of devices or
manufacturer activities.
The FDA typically requires, in the labeling of an approved
medical device, specific instructions for use of the device and
warnings about potential adverse events that could result from its
use. For example, the FDA may require a manual to be given to
patients who have had a pacemaker implanted which contains a
specific warning to keep “at least 24 inches (60 centimeters) away
153
from the heat source” of an electric induction cooktop. Or FDA
requirements may be more generally applicable, such as its CGMP.
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *3.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see also McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.
2005) (“Where a federal requirement permits a course of conduct and the state
makes it obligatory, the state’s requirement is in addition to federal requirement
and thus is preempted.”).
153. See MEDTRONIC INC., HEART FAILURE PACEMAKER WITH DEFIBRILLATION
PATIENT MANUAL 39 (2009), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs
/pdf/P010031S232c.pdf.
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These regulations represent an “umbrella” approach to regulation
applicable to “many different types of devices” and do “not
prescribe in detail how a manufacturer must produce a specific
154
device.”
They provide “flexibility,” allowing “each manufacturer
to establish requirements for each type or family of devices that will
result in devices that are safe and effective, and to establish
methods and procedures to design, produce, distribute, etc. devices
155
that meet the quality system requirements.”
This issue of whether a state-law-based claim must be parallel
to a device-specific, or only a more general industry-wide, FDA
requirement was discussed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in the context of a motion to dismiss in In re
Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Product Liability Litigation (Sprint
156
Fidelis Leads II). Plaintiffs across the country filed actions against
Medtronic alleging defects in the leads (small wires) connecting an
implantable cardiac defibrillator (ICD) directly to a patient’s heart
157
muscle to carry an electrical impulse. These complaints followed
in the wake of a recall by Medtronic of ICDs using a lead termed by
158
the manufacturer as a “Sprint Fidelis” lead.
At the time of the
recall, approximately 257,000 Sprint Fidelis leads remained
159
implanted in patients.
Scores of these claims were consolidated
for pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
160
Medtronic filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims
Litigation.
161
in the master complaint, arguing preemption and citing Riegel.
162
The federal district court granted the motion.
163
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal,
agreeing that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted under Riegel
and stating that “the crucial question on appeal is whether these
claims are parallel claims that avoid preemption because they
would not impose state requirements ‘different from or in addition
to’ the federal requirements established by PMA approval of the
154. Quality System (QS) Regulation/Medical Device Good Manufacturing Practices,
supra note 56.
155. Id.
156. Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
157. Id. at 1203.
158. Id.
159. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig. (Sprint Fidelis
Leads I), 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1154 (D. Minn. 2009).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1154–55.
162. Id. at 1165.
163. Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d at 1209.
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164

Sprint Fidelis lead.”
The court first determined that the failure to warn, and related
claims, were preempted because “[e]ven if federal law allowed
Medtronic to provide additional warnings, as [p]laintiffs alleged,
any state law imposing an additional requirement is preempted”
because it is a requirement in addition to the federal
165
requirement.
Then the court decided that the design defect
claims were also preempted because “they are attacks on the
risk/benefit analysis that led the FDA to approve” the device and
166
such claims are expressly preempted.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the leads had a manufacturing
defect because Medtronic’s manufacturing processes were not in
compliance with the FDA’s CGMP found in the Quality System
167
Regulations (QSR) applicable to all medical devices. The district
court had concluded that these manufacturing defect claims were
preempted because the CGMP provide only general objectives for
quality systems applicable to all device manufacturers, and plaintiffs
had failed to identify any specific federal manufacturing
168
requirement that was violated.
Consequently, the plaintiffs had
not alleged a parallel manufacturing defect claim with the detail
169
required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly to avoid preemption
170
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court
under Riegel.
had held them to an impossible pleading standard because the
FDA’s specific manufacturing requirements applicable to this
particular product were in the agency’s PMA approval files, which
171
were not accessible without discovery.
However, as the court of
appeals explained, the plaintiffs had alleged in their pleading that
“state law entitles every person who has an implanted Sprint Fidelis
lead[]” to relief because all such leads have an unreasonably high

164. Id. at 1205.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1206.
167. Id. See generally 21 C.F.R. Part 820 (2012).
168. Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157–58 (D. Minn. 2009)
(explaining that CGMP are “too generic” and provide only “general objectives” for
device manufacturers, and stating that “[i]n the absence of any specific
requirement in the [CGMP] . . . holding Medtronic liable for such a
[manufacturing] ‘defect’ would impose requirements ‘different from, or in
addition to’ those under federal law”).
169. 550 U.S. 544, 554–56 (2007).
170. Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1157–59.
171. Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d at 1206.
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172

risk of failure.
This argument amounts to a design defect, not a
173
“Thus, as pleaded and argued, the
manufacturing defect, claim.
manufacturing defect claims are not parallel, they are a frontal
174
assault on the FDA’s decision to approve” the device.
The court appeared to conclude that any applicable federal
requirement must be specific to the device. First, it said nothing to
contradict the reasoning underlying the district court’s dismissal of
the complaint.
That court had said that CGMP “require
manufacturers to develop their own quality-system controls . . . and
they are inherently flexible,” and therefore concluded that these
regulations were “simply too generic” and did “not prescribe in
175
detail how a manufacturer must produce a specific device.”
“In
the absence of any specific requirement in the CGMP[]/QSR that
Medtronic weld the Sprint Fidelis leads in a certain fashion,
holding Medtronic liable for such a welding ‘defect’ would impose
requirements ‘different from, or in addition to’ those under
176
Second, the appellate court said that “courts must
federal law.”
exercise [care] in applying Riegel’s parallel claim principle at the
pleading stage, particularly to manufacturing defect claims. But
here, plaintiffs simply failed to adequately plead that Medtronic
violated a federal requirement specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of
177
this Class III device.”
Substantially the same result was reached in Horowitz v. Stryker
Corp., in which the court found that the plaintiff failed to show that
its manufacturing defect claims against the manufacturer of a hip
178
prosthesis were based on a violation of a federal requirement.
“[P]laintiff’s ‘reliance on [defendants’ violations of] CGMP[] and
QSR . . . does not save these claims from preemption . . . [as such
requirements] are simply too generic, standing alone, to serve as
179
the basis for [her] manufacturing-defect claim[].’”
And, in
Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff’s state-law negligence per se
claim against the manufacturer of an implantable pain medication
pump, based on the manufacturer’s failure to manufacture the
172. Id. at 1207.
173. See id.
174. Id.
175. Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 1158.
177. Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d at 1207 (emphasis added).
178. 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
179. Id. at 284 (alteration in original) (quoting Sprint Fidelis Leads I, 592 F.
Supp. 2d at 1157).
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pump in accordance with CGMP, was preempted because it was not
180
based on violation of any specific federal requirement. The court
concluded that the “intentionally vague and open-ended nature of
the regulations relied upon is the precise reason why they cannot
181
serve as the basis for a parallel claim.”
The intertwined questions of whether a plaintiff has
established a parallel claim and whether the claim is properly
pleaded were treated by the Eleventh Circuit in Wolicki-Gables v.
182
Arrow International, Inc. in a fashion similar to the Eighth Circuit’s
disposition of the claims in the Sprint Fidelis Leads II case. WolickiGables alleged that she was injured by a defective pain medication
pump system that had been implanted in her back to manage pain
183
resulting from two back injuries.
The federal district court
dismissed her product liability and other claims after concluding
184
that they were expressly preempted by the MDA. On appeal, the
plaintiff argued that her state-law claims survived preemption
185
because they were parallel claims.
The Eleventh Circuit said that plaintiffs must allege in their
186
initial pleading facts that the manufacturer violated a particular
187
federal requirement referring to the allegedly defective device
and concluded by saying that “‘[t]o properly allege parallel claims,
the complaint must set forth facts’ pointing to specific PMA
188
requirements that have been violated.”
Because the plaintiff’s
complaint did not set forth any specific failure to comply with any
FDA regulation that could be linked to the injury, it thus failed to
189
plead an un-preempted parallel claim.
190
In Deglemann v. Advanced Medical Optics, the Court of Appeals
180. 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
181. Id. at 588.
182. Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011).
183. Id. at 1297–99.
184. See Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Fla.
2009).
185. Wolicki-Gables, 634 F.3d at 1300.
186. Id. at 1301 (“Parallel claims must be specifically stated in the initial
pleadings.”).
187. Id. (“A plaintiff must allege that ‘[the] defendant violated a particular
federal specification referring to the device at issue.’”) (quoting Ilarraza v.
Medtronic, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
188. Id. (quoting Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (D. Colo.
2008)).
189. Id. at 1301–02.
190. 659 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and dismissed per stipulation, 699 F.3d
1103 (9th Cir. 2012).
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for the Ninth Circuit concluded that FDA guidance documents for
contact lens solutions created specific federal requirements
sufficient to trigger preemption of claims brought by a putative
class of consumers, based on California’s Unfair Competition Law
and False Advertising Law, that they would not have bought the
defendant’s contact lens disinfectant if they had known that it was
191
not as effective as other solutions. The court said that “[t]he first
step of our preemption analysis is deciding whether the FDA has
promulgated a specific requirement that applies to contact lens
192
solution.”
Then, noting that the lens solution was a Class II
device that came to market under section 510(k) of the MDA, the
court nevertheless concluded that the “special controls” to which
the defendant’s lens solution was subject “are federal requirements
that apply to the testing, manufacture, and labeling of” such
193
solutions.
The FDA’s guidance document with which contact
lens solution manufacturers must comply in order to be labeled a
disinfecting solution requires such solutions to achieve a prescribed
194
level of efficacy in killing five representative microorganisms.
The court concluded that the FDA had thus “promulgated specific
requirements” for the defendant’s contact lens solution, and that
the plaintiffs’ claims were expressly preempted because they would
195
impose different requirements under the state law.
In all of these cases, the courts appear to insist on a federal-law
requirement that is aimed quite specifically at the medical device
alleged to have been the cause of the plaintiff’s harm. In
Deglemann, the FDA guidance document applied in exactly the
same way to all contact lens cleaning solutions, but it imposed on
196
all such solutions a specific performance requirement.
Other
circuits, however, have taken a more liberal view of the pleading
requirements for successfully alleging a parallel state claim and
avoiding summary dismissal of the complaint on preemption
197
grounds. The Seventh Circuit in Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the Sixth

191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 842.
Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
Id. at 841–42.
Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PREMARKET NOTIFICATION (510(K)) GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
FOR CONTACT LENS CARE PRODUCTS 89 (1997)).
195. Id. at 842.
196. Id.
197. 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 498 (2011).
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198

Circuit in Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, and the Fifth Circuit in
199
200
Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp. and in Bass v. Stryker Corp., have
all found plaintiffs’ pleadings to state parallel claims with sufficient
adequacy to avoid dismissal, even where no device-specific federal
requirement existed.
In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the Seventh Circuit was faced with the
same issue decided by the Eighth Circuit in the Sprint Fidelis Leads II
201
case. Margaret Bausch alleged that she had been injured by a hip
prosthesis manufactured by the defendant that failed because it was
202
“adulterated” and had to be replaced.
The FDCA defines an
“adulterated” device as one “not in conformity with applicable
203
requirements or conditions.”
Bausch alleged that the
manufacturer failed to comply with federal standards established by
204
The trial court dismissed her complaint,
the FDA’s CGMP.
205
holding that the claims were expressly preempted.
On appeal,
the court found the key issue to be whether
the plaintiff must allege and prove a violation of a
“concrete, device-specific” federal regulation. The issue is
important because manufacturers of Class III medical
devices are required by federal law to comply with Quality
System Regulations established by the FDA. The Quality
System Regulations also set forth Current Good
206
Manufacturing Practices.
While the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff must plead that a
specific federal manufacturing practice applicable to defendant’s
207
device had been violated, the Bausch court noted that the MDA
expressly preempts any state-law requirement that is different from
208
or in addition to “any [federal] requirement” applicable to the
device and concluded that a plaintiff’s pleading is adequate if it

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
Ill. Aug.
(2011).
206.
207.
208.

382 F. App’x 436 (6th Cir. 2010).
631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011).
669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012).
Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
Bausch, 630 F.3d at 549. .
21 U.S.C. § 351(h) (2006).
Bausch, 630 F.3d at 556.
Bausch v. Stryker Corp., No. 08 C 4248, 2009 WL 2827954, at *4–5 (N.D.
31, 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 498
Bausch, 630 F.3d at 554.
Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 2010).
630 F.3d at 555 (emphasis added).
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simply alleges violation of the FDA’s CGMP and QSR.
“[W]e do
not see a sound legal basis for defendants’ proposal to distinguish
between general requirements and ‘concrete, device-specific’
210
requirements.”
The Sixth Circuit has also rejected the idea that a federal
requirement exists only if there is a device-specific requirement. In
Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent per se under Oklahoma law when it
manufactured a knee implant that failed due to a manufacturing
process that left lubricating oil residue on the implant in violation
211
of the FDA’s CGMP. The court reversed the district court’s grant
to the defendant of summary judgment on preemption grounds,
concluding that the CGMP are “not so vague as to be incapable of
212
enforcement.”
213
In Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
the Fifth Circuit
considered a Mississippi state-law-based claim that the
manufacturer of a medical device designed to treat excess uterine
bleeding had negligently failed to warn about risks associated with
the device, because Boston Scientific had failed to report earlier
malfunctions of the device resulting in a “serious injury” as
required by the FDA’s Medical Device Reporting (MDR)
214
regulations.
The pertinent regulations define “serious injury” as
“an injury or illness that is life-threatening, results in permanent
impairment of a body function or permanent damage to a body
structure, or necessitates medical or surgical intervention to
preclude permanent impairment of a body function or permanent
215
damage to a body structure.” Boston Scientific had developed an
“algorithm” for reporting that included the reporting of some, but
not all, cases in which the device caused some kind of burn
216
injury.
The manufacturer later began to report more burn
injuries, allegedly in response to a request or direction from the

209. Id.
210. Id.; see also Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145, 159–160
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
211. 382 F. App’x 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2010).
212. Id. at 440.
213. 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011).
214. Id. at 765–66; 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a)
(2012).
215. 21 C.F.R. § 803.3; see 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(2).
216. Under this algorithm, no first-degree and only some second-degree burn
injuries were reported. Hughes, 631 F.3d at 766.
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217

FDA.
The court concluded that, for purposes of resolving the
summary judgment issue, the plaintiff had stated an un-preempted
parallel claim when she alleged a state-law failure to warn claim
predicated on the manufacturer’s failure to report serious injuries
as required by FDA regulations: “A factfinder could infer that a
manufacturer’s failure to provide this information as required by
FDA regulations is a parallel violation of the state duty to provide
218
reasonable and adequate information about a device’s risks.”
219
And in a more recent Fifth Circuit case, Bass v. Stryker Corp., a
plaintiff sued alleging that his hip replacement device,
manufactured by the defendant, failed to attach properly to the
bone due to manufacturing residuals on the device, requiring a
220
second surgery. After the district court dismissed all of his claims
on preemption grounds, Bass appealed, arguing that he had pled
parallel state-law claims to the extent that the claims were based on
manufacturing defects resulting from violations of FDA
221
regulations.
In particular, his pleadings alleged that Stryker
initiated a recall of the device following an investigation in which
the FDA found manufacturing residuals in excess of those
permitted and that the device was therefore “adulterated” within
222
the meaning of the relevant provision of the FDCA.
The court
noted that the plaintiff’s complaint “specifies with particularity
what went wrong in the manufacturing process and cites the
relevant FDA manufacturing standards Stryker allegedly
223
violated.”
The complaint also alleged that the FDA had
determined that the device was “adulterated within the meaning of
224
section 501(h) of the [FDCA].” The court said that
[t]he key distinction between complaints that are
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and those that
are not is not reliance on CGMP[], but rather the
existence of a manufacturing defect caused by a violation
of federal regulations and allegations connecting a defect
in the manufacture of the specific device to that plaintiff’s

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
(2011)).
224.

See id. at 766–67.
Id. at 770–71.
669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 505–06.
21 U.S.C. § 351(h) (2006); Bass, 669 F.3d at 510.
Bass, 669 F.3d at 510 (quoting Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 782
Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
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225

specific injury,”
and concluded by holding that “if a plaintiff pleads that a
manufacturer of a Class III medical device failed to comply with
either the specific processes and procedures that were approved by
the FDA or the CGMP[] themselves and that this failure caused the
226
injury, the plaintiff will have pleaded a parallel claim.”
A federal district court in the Fifth Circuit has taken an
especially liberal view of whether there exists a federal requirement
in a case in which a woman brought suit on behalf of her deceased
husband who died when a critical part of his implanted heart assist
pump system failed, causing the pump to fail and leading to a fatal
227
228
cardiac arrest.
In Bush v. Thoratec Corp., the manufacturer’s
device, a Left Ventricular Assist System (LVAS), had been
229
implanted in Mr. Bush in 2008.
The LVAS is a mechanical
circulatory device used to partially replace the function of a failing
heart by providing assistance to that part of the heart that pumps
230
blood into the body’s circulatory system.
The device was
implanted at McGuire VA Medical Center, while Bush was living in
231
Virginia. He returned to McGuire for inspection and monitoring
of his implant for a few months, until he moved to New Orleans,
where he then made monthly visits to Tulane Medical Center for
232
the same monitoring.
Shortly after Bush had received the
implant, the manufacturer issued a press release and sent an
Urgent Medical Device Correction letter to the hospitals that
233
installed and monitored this device.
That letter indicated that
the manufacturer had become aware, over time, that the lead
connecting the LVAS to its external controller could fail due to
wear and fatigue, warned that the damage may or may not be
visible to someone inspecting the lead, identified certain signs of
damage, and advised hospitals to request their patients to return
234
for inspection of the lead.
Both McGuire and Tulane received
225. Id. at 511–12.
226. Id. at 512.
227. Bush v. Thoratec Corp., No. 11–1654, 2012 WL 2513669 (E.D. La. June
28, 2012).
228. Id.
229. Id. at *1.
230. See Ventricular Assist Devices, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org
/ventricular-assist-devices (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
231. Bush, 2012 WL 2513669, at *1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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235

the letter, but neither notified Bush of the risk. Approximately a
year-and-a-half after the warning letter was sent to the hospitals,
236
Bush’s device failed, resulting in his death.
In her second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had violated an FDA regulation, which provides
guidelines for product recall notices, and that the violation
237
amounted to a failure to warn under state law.
The defendant-manufacturer argued that the federal
238
regulation was too general to support a parallel state-law claim.
The regulation upon which Bush based her claim characterized the
239
guidelines in the regulation as “[g]eneral.” Those guidelines say
that the “format, content, and extent of a recall communication
should be commensurate with the hazard of the product being
recalled and the strategy developed for that recall” and describe
240
the purposes of such recall notices “[i]n general terms.”
The
court said “[a]dmittedly” the guidelines provided by the regulation
were “more general than the MDR reporting requirements
allegedly violated in Hughes or the [C]GMP[] allegedly violated in
Bass” (both cases in which the Fifth Circuit had rejected arguments
that the relevant FDA regulations were too general), but it
nevertheless denied the manufacturer’s motion to dismiss on
241
preemption grounds.
The court concluded that the plaintiff’s
242
allegations were “sufficient . . . to survive a motion to dismiss.”
To call the regulation at issue in Bush “more general” than the
one at issue in Hughes is a gross understatement. As the Hughes
court explained, the “plain text” of the reporting regulations at
issue in that case required the device manufacturer to report “any
time” the device “‘may have caused or contributed to death or
serious injury,’ or malfunctioned in a manner that ‘would be likely
to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury in [sic] the
243
malfunction were to recur.’” Furthermore, the court pointed out
that the term “serious injury” has a definition that is “mandated by

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at *2.
238. Id. at *2.
239. 21 C.F.R. § 7.49 (2012).
240. Id.
241. Bush, 2012 WL 2513669, at *7, *9.
242. Id. at *7.
243. Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 773 (5th Cir. 2011)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a)(1)(A)–(B)(2006)).
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244

statute.”
A case like Bush raises a particular concern about whether
there is a “requirement” in any meaningful sense of the term.
Before a fact finder can decide whether a federal requirement has
been violated, she must understand fairly precisely what conduct is
required or prohibited by federal law, and then compare those
requirements or prohibitions to the manufacturer’s conduct. The
federal regulation at issue in Bush is too general, admitting of more
than one interpretation of the law’s requirements. The parameters
of the federal requirement are questions of law, the answers to
which will not become more clear after discovery of more facts. An
allegation of a federal requirement of this level of generality should
245
not be “sufficient for [a] Plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss.”
The result may be that a jury will eventually be left to determine the
meaning, not just the application, of the law.
This split among the circuits on the critical issue of just how
specific the federal requirement allegedly violated must be may
ultimately draw the Supreme Court’s attention and lead to review
by that Court. Some plaintiffs attempting to avoid dismissal on the
pleadings, such as those in Sprint Fidelis Leads II, for example, have
had trouble showing with sufficient specificity the existence of a
federal requirement. There, the Eighth Circuit required the
plaintiffs’ pleadings to show that the defendant had “violated a
federal requirement specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of this Class
246
III device.”
But other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Hughes,
appear to give plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading the
existence of a federal requirement. There the critical issue was
whether an FDA reporting regulation that required the reporting
of “serious” injuries caused by the device was, indeed, a federal
requirement applicable to the defendant’s conduct. That court
concluded that a factfinder “could infer” that there was a federal
247
requirement.
But the factfinder should not be left to “infer”
whether there is a federal requirement applicable to the device in
issue; that is, whether federal law could be interpreted to apply.
That question should be resolved by the court as a matter of law
and then leave to the factfinder the task of determining whether
244.
245.
246.
added).
247.

Id.
Bush, 2012 WL 2513669, at *7.
Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1207 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
Hughes, 631 F.3d at 770–71.
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the requirement has or has not been satisfied. It is the difference
between deciding whether there is a legal requirement and
whether that law has been violated.
X. VIOLATION OF FEDERAL REQUIREMENT?
Assuming that there is a federal requirement applicable to the
device, genuine equivalency next requires that the plaintiff allege
and prove that the device failed to comply with that federal
requirement. Assume, for example, that the manufacturer of a
drug-coated stent, which has been approved so as to make it a
248
“restricted device” under the FDCA, represents that the coating
on the device does not increase the inflammatory response in
coronary arteries into which the stent is implanted. Also assume
that this representation was not approved by the FDA nor is it part
of the FDA-approved label for the device. That representation
would then make the device “misbranded,” and the introduction of
the device into interstate commerce would be a violation of the
249
FDCA.
Another example, provided by the court in Bass, is to
“suppose a manufacturer had represented to the FDA in its preapproval documentation that each hip implant component would
250
be sterilized for ten minutes at 800 degrees.”
Proof that the
manufacturer instead sterilized the component at only 200 degrees
for five minutes would then demonstrate the manufacturer’s
251
violation of “what it told the FDA.”
On the other hand, an allegation that a device manufacturer
was negligent because its implantable pain medication pump
should have been labeled with warnings different from what the
FDA required does not allege a violation of a federal requirement
because the manufacturer cannot change the label without the
252
FDA’s approval.
XI. STATE-LAW DUTY SAME AS DUTY IMPOSED UNDER FEDERAL LAW?
Genuine equivalency also requires the plaintiff to show that
the same conduct that violates the FDA requirement gives rise to a
state-law cause of action that predates the federal requirement such
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1).
Id. §§ 331, 352(q)(1).
Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 513.
See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2

2013]

PUZZLE OF PARALLEL CLAIMS

1067

as negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation, or breach of
253
For example, the same conduct that makes the drugwarranty.
coated stent misbranded under the FDCA could also give rise to an
intentional or negligent misrepresentation claim under state
common law or a state statute-based claim for false or misleading
advertising.
The part of the Lohr court’s opinion discussing parallel statelaw claims fell under the heading in the court’s opinion titled
254
“Identity of Requirements Claims.”
And, as the Riley court
subsequently explained, in order for a state-law claim to be parallel
and escape express preemption, it “must be premised on the
breach of a state-law duty that is the same as a duty imposed under
255
the FDCA.”
The question then becomes: How is it determined
whether the requirements of the state and federal-law claims are
identical to or the “same as” one another?
In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant manufacturers marketed a hip prosthesis that was
implanted in her body after the FDA had informed the defendants
that a component of the device was “adulterated,” and that the
implant failed, requiring surgical replacement of the device leading
256
to a number of injuries. The court first noted that under Illinois
law, “violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human
life or property [i]s prima facie evidence of negligence, though the
violation may not always be conclusive on the issue of
257
negligence.” Then, the court found that a manufacturer’s failure
to comply with the FDA’s general CGMP regulations would make
258
the device “adulterated” under federal law.
Finally, the court
concluded that the state-law negligence claim was parallel to the
259
claim of a federal-law violation and thus not expressly preempted,
saying that
[w]hile there may not be a “traditional state tort law”
claim for an “adulterated” product in so many words, the
federal definition of adulterated medical devices is tied
directly to the duty of manufacturers to avoid foreseeable
253. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009).
254. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. 470, 494–97 (1996).
255. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (emphasis added).
256. 630 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2010).
257. Id. at 553.
258. Id. at 555.
259. See id. at 552 (“[W]here state law is parallel to federal law, section 360k
does not preempt the claim.”).
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dangers with their products by complying with federal law.
The evidence showing a violation of federal law shows that
the device is adulterated and goes a long way toward
showing that the manufacturer breached a duty under
260
state law toward the patient.
In Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., the court, discussing the
plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant violated a state-law duty to
warn “by failing to accurately report serious injuries and
malfunctions of [its] device as required by the FDA’s . . .
regulations,” could prove that allegation because “[a] factfinder
could infer that a manufacturer’s failure to provide this
information as required by FDA regulations is a parallel violation of
the state duty to provide reasonable and adequate information
261
about a device’s risks.”
XII. APPLY “SAME ELEMENTS” TEST?
The Bausch court clearly, and the Hughes court not as clearly,
both suggest that the test for determining whether state- and
federal-law claims are parallel is analogous to the Blockburger “same
elements” test used by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine when
262
two offenses are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes. Using
this test would require a comparison of the state statute or common
law cause of action with the federal statute or regulation. When the
elements are compared, if the state-law based-claim requires proof
of an element different from those required to prove the federallaw-based claim, then the state-law claim is not parallel. An
example of this test in application may be found in City of Baton
263
Rouge v. Ross, a case in which a criminal defendant charged with
violating a municipal ordinance that prohibited “drug traffic
loitering” filed a motion to quash, alleging that the ordinance was
expressly preempted by a Louisiana statute providing that no
political subdivision of the state “shall enact an ordinance defining
as an offense conduct that is defined and punishable as a felony
264
under state law.”
Importantly for purposes of this discussion of
260. Id. at 557.
261. 631 F.3d 762, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
263. 654 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1995).
264. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:143(A) (1995), quoted in Ross, 654 So. 2d at
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constitutional preemption principles, the Louisiana Supreme
Court first observed that in this case “the State’s interest is one of
constitutional import, since the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
expressly accords to the legislature, and not to local governments,
the exclusive right to define felonies and to the district attorneys
265
the exclusive right to prosecute them.”
“More particularly, the
Louisiana Constitution expressly provides that ‘[n]o local
governmental subdivision shall . . . define and provide for the
266
punishment of a felony.’”
When a municipality defines as a misdemeanor an offense
that the legislature has designated a felony, and places a
defendant in “jeopardy” for committing that offense so
that the State cannot later retry the defendant, the
municipality effectively prevents the State from inflicting
upon the defendant the punishment the Legislature has
decided is appropriate for the severity of that defendant’s
267
conduct.
The court then applied the “same elements” test to answer the
preemption question, saying that “it provides a straightforward
method of determining whether, on its face, a municipal ordinance
268
constitutes the ‘same offense’ as a state felony statute” and
concluded that the local ordinance was expressly preempted by the
269
state statute.
But a state-law claim may still be parallel even if it requires
proof of additional elements beyond those required to prove a
violation of federal law, or if the state-law claim would impose
different remedies for the violation than those imposed by federal
law. For example, it may be necessary as a matter of state law to
prove that violations of the FDCA amount to negligent conduct in
order to demonstrate all of the elements of the state-law cause of
action. But in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the court explained that
additional elements required to demonstrate a state-law cause of
action
would make the state requirements narrower, not
broader, than the federal requirement. While such a
1313–15.
265. Ross, 654 So. 2d at 1319 (citing LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(A)(1); art. V,
§ 26(B)).
266. Id. (quoting LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(A)(1)).
267. Id. (citations omitted).
268. Id. at 1324.
269. Id. at 1325.
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narrower requirement might be “different from” the
federal rules in a literal sense, such a difference would
surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption of
270
a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule.
Furthermore, the state- and federal-law remedies for the
271
defendant’s violation need not be the same. The Lohr court
concluded that the express preemption provision of the MDA does
not deny a state “the right to provide a traditional damages remedy
for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel
272
Thus, for example, while the remedy for
federal requirements.”
a federal-law violation may be an administrative penalty or some
kind of equitable relief, the remedy for the state-law violation for
the same conduct may be the imposition of a damages remedy, and
the state-law claim will still be considered to be parallel to the
federal-law claim. This view of the meaning of a parallel claim was
subsequently affirmed in Riegel when the court concluded that
“§ 360k does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy
for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state
duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal
273
requirements.”
XIII. THE SCOPE OF EXPRESS PREEMPTION
In sum, if the state-law-based claim does not parallel a claim
for violation of the federal requirements, it is expressly preempted
by the MDA. To determine whether a state law claim is preempted
because it is different from or in addition to federal law or simply
parallels federal law, one must (1) look at the defendant’s conduct
that gives rise to the plaintiff’s right to recover under state law, and
(2) determine whether that conduct is prohibited by the FDCA. If
it is not, the claim is expressly preempted by § 360k(a). The courts
differ in their views of the precise scope of express preemption,
some holding the view that federal law is broadly preemptive
because surviving state-law claims must parallel narrow device270. 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996).
271. I use the term “violation” loosely here to include the breach of a state
common law duty.
272. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495. “The presence of a damages remedy does not
amount to the additional or different ‘requirement’ that is necessary under the
statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply
with identical existing ‘requirements’ under federal law.” Id.
273. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008); see also Hughes v.
Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir. 2011).
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specific federal requirements, while others maintain that state-law
claims need only parallel broader generally-applicable federal
requirements to remain un-preempted. This scope-of-expresspreemption question will ultimately have to be resolved by the
Supreme Court.
However, even if not expressly preempted, the state-law claim
may be impliedly preempted under Buckman. It is to that question
that we now turn.
XIV. WHICH PARALLEL CLAIMS ARE IMPLIEDLY PREEMPTED?
As noted earlier, the Buckman court drew a distinction between
the claim for fraud against the federal agency and the state-law
causes of action raised in Lohr, including the claim for failure to
warn of pacemaker lead failures despite knowledge of earlier
failures, noting that Lohr “can be read to allow certain state-law
274
causes of action that parallel federal safety requirements.”
In Lohr, the plaintiffs’ claims were based upon traditional state275
law tort theories of negligence and strict liability.
But in
Buckman, by way of contrast, the plaintiffs were bringing a claim
based upon, and that existed solely because of, the FDCA. That
distinction was important to the outcome in which the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “any violation of the FDCA
276
will support a state-law claim.” It is thus clear that some state-law
claims based on an FDCA violation are impliedly preempted but
also clear that some FDCA violations will support an un-preempted
parallel state-law claim. The court did not consider whether
parallel state-law claims not based on fraud, but based on
negligence or strict liability, or some other theory of liability, might
also be impliedly preempted. Therefore the scope of Buckman is
far from clear, and the court has not subsequently made clear
which state-law claims involving federal-law violations interfere with
the FDA’s regulatory and enforcement authority, and are therefore
impliedly preempted, and which are not.
After Buckman, some commentators suggested that the
Supreme Court’s implied preemption analysis could be extended
beyond fraud-on-the-FDA claims to preclude other common law

274.
275.
276.

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 481.
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
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277

claims.
Several courts have indeed read Buckman broadly to
mean that any private action that incorporates a violation of an
FDA regulation is impliedly preempted.
An early example of an expansive interpretation of Buckman is
Flynn v. American Home Products Corp., a case in which the Minnesota
Court of Appeals applied Buckman to hold that a plaintiff’s
common-law-fraud and consumer-fraud claims, based on fraud-onthe-FDA, were “preempted by federal law and are not actionable in
278
Minnesota.”
The plaintiff, who had taken a generic version of
the prescription diet drug combination known as “fen-phen,” sued
the manufacturer of a brand-name version of one of the drug’s
279
components, fenfluramine.
Although the plaintiff had never
consumed the defendant’s product, she alleged that the defendant
violated FDA requirements by failing to report information
regarding known adverse health events associated with the drug
280
and instead misrepresented to the FDA that the drug was safe. As
a result, she claimed, physicians began prescribing the drug as part
of the fen-phen combination, and her doctor, without knowing the
281
risks, prescribed her the generic fen-phen version.
The court dismissed her common-law and consumer-fraud
claims on preemption grounds, noting that, as in Buckman, the
FDA had the authority to police the regulatory violations that
282
formed the bases of the plaintiff’s claims.
Not only would the
existence of state-law-misrepresentation and consumer-fraud claims
conflict with the FDA’s authority to consistently police such
violations within its regulatory powers, but also, “50 state-law causes
of action for violation of the FDA’s detailed regulations would
283
increase the burdens placed on applicants for FDA approval.”
277. See, e.g., Rebecca Porter, Supreme Court Rules that Suit for Fraud on Federal
Agency Is Preempted, TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 17, 82 (“[Buckman] ‘could leave consumers
out in the cold without any remedy.’”) (quoting Jeffrey White, Associate General
Counsel for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America); Raymond M. Williams &
Anita Jain, Preemption of State “Fraud-on-the-FDA” Claims, FOR DEF., June 2001, at 23–
25, 50 (“[The] FDA’s regulatory scheme is arguably just as endangered when
liability is imposed due to a state law failure to warn or design defect claim as it is
when liability is imposed for a fraud-on-the-FDA claim.”).
278. Flynn v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001).
279. Id. at 345.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 349.
283. Id. (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350
(2001)).
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284

More recently, in Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., the plaintiff alleged
that his hip implant was defective and sued the manufacturer
claiming relief under Texas law for negligence, strict liability, and
285
that state’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
According to the
complaint, manufacturing residues coating part of the implant
286
prevented it from being securely held into the hip socket. To the
extent that these state-law claims paralleled federal requirements
prohibiting “adulterated devices,” the federal district court ruled
that they were impliedly preempted because such federal violations
287
“are to be enforced through the United States government only.”
288
Similarly, in Wheeler v. DePuy Spine, Inc., the court concluded that
a plaintiff’s claim that it was negligent under Florida law for the
manufacturer of an artificial spinal disc to not accurately disclose to
the FDA the number of complications associated with the implant’s
use of which the manufacturer was aware, appeared to be an
impliedly preempted claim for noncompliance with MDA
provisions: “The FDCA ‘leaves no doubt’ that it is the Federal
Government and not private litigants who are authorized to sue for
289
noncompliance with the medical device provisions.” And in Riley
v. Cordis, the plaintiff was implanted with a stent manufactured by
290
the defendant.
After he later suffered a heart attack, due to a
blood clot that had formed at the site of his stent, he brought
numerous claims against the stent manufacturer including a claim
that Cordis was promoting the off-label use of the stent in a
291
manner not authorized by the FDCA. The court ruled that such
a claim was impliedly preempted. It is not private parties but “the
FDA [that] is charged with the difficult task of regulating the
292
marketing . . . of medical devices.”
Plaintiffs suing device manufacturers for injuries allegedly
caused by a device commonly assert a negligence per se count in
their pleadings, arguing that a violation of federal regulations
demonstrates negligence under state common law. They argue
that the negligence per se claim thus does not impose any
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

724 F. Supp. 2d 648 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 659.
Id.
706 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
Id. at 1269 n.4.
625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (D. Minn. 2009).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 778.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/2

40

Prince: The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the Parti

1074

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:4

requirement on a device manufacturer that is different from or in
addition to federal requirements. Nevertheless, some courts have
293
found these claims to be impliedly preempted.
For example, in
McClelland v. Medtronic, Inc., a decedent’s estate sued for the
decedent’s death, arguing that it was caused by a defective pulse
generator, a critical part of a pacemaker manufactured by the
294
defendant.
The plaintiff sued in Florida state court, alleging
295
Medtronic removed
negligence per se as part of its complaint.
the case to federal court and argued that the negligence per se
claim should be dismissed because Florida law does not recognize a
cause of action for violations of the FDCA or its implementing
296
regulations.
The court agreed, saying that “under Florida law,
the violation of a statute can only give rise to civil liability if the
297
statute indicates an intention to create a private cause of action.”
Noting that “[t]he FDCA expressly provides that all actions to
enforce the Act ‘shall be by and in the name of the United States,’”
the court concluded that “[t]his language evidences legislative
intent to prohibit a private right of action for a violation of the
FDCA. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot assert a negligence per se claim
based on violations of the FDCA or the FDA’s implementing
298
regulations.”
In other words, the court concluded that the
negligence per se count of the plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim under state law, and the reason
that it failed to state a claim was that the FDCA does not indicate an
intention to create a private cause of action. Indeed, to the
contrary, that statute indicates Congress’s intent that enforcement
of those FDA regulations is the exclusive province of the FDA.
But while some courts have found the scope of Buckman
preemption to be quite broad, others have limited its holding solely
293. But several courts have ruled that such claims are not preempted. See
infra, text accompanying notes 317–335.
294. No. 6:11–CV–1444–Orl–36KRS, 2012 WL 5077401 (M.D. Fla., Sept. 27,
2012).
295. Id.
296. Id. at *2, *4.
297. Id. at *5 (citing Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985–86 (Fla.
1994)).
298. Id. But many states have held that a state-law negligence per se claim can
be based on violation of FDA regulations. See, e.g., Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig
Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 932–33 (5th Cir. 2006); Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods.,
Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 563–64 (3d Cir. 1983); Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d
727, 733 (2d Cir. 1979); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th
Cir. 1960); Valente v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 48 F. Supp. 2d 862, 876 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
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to fraud-on-the-FDA claims.
299
In Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., a panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled
that certain parallel state-law claims of negligence were impliedly
300
preempted.
The plaintiff in this case alleged that he was
rendered paraplegic as a result of an inflammation that had
developed in his spine at the site of a catheter that was part of an
301
implanted pain medication pump manufactured by Medtronic.
In a proposed amended complaint, Stengel alleged that under
federal law and regulation Medtronic “was under a continuing duty
to monitor the product after premarket approval and to discover
and report to the FDA any complaints about the product’s
performance and any adverse health consequences of which it
became aware and that are or may be attributable to the
302
product.”
The court noted that, to whatever extent the alleged
violations of FDA regulations are actionable under state law, they
“parallel the federal requirements, and thus are not expressly
303
preempted.”
But, the court explained, the Stengels’ theory that
survived express preemption was that if Medtronic had acted with
reasonable care in complying with the regulations that required it
to provide information to the FDA, the agency would have required
the manufacturer to warn physicians about the risk, and Stengel
304
could have avoided the injury caused by the pump. In effect, the
plaintiffs were alleging that “the defendant . . . misinformed the
FDA tacitly by failing to report information that it had a duty to
305
report.”
Relying on Buckman, the court ruled that this claim was
306
“There is no meaningful distinction
impliedly preempted.
between the Stengels’ failure-to-warn claims and the fraud-on-the307
FDA claims held to be preempted in Buckman.”
This conclusion
is consistent with that of the Eighth Circuit in Sprint Fidelis Leads II,
in which the court described plaintiff’s allegations that “Medtronic
failed to provide the FDA with sufficient information and did not
timely file adverse event reports, as required by federal regulations”

299.
2013).
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

676 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir.
See id. at 1163.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1163 (quoting Plaintiff’s Substitute Amended Complaint).
Id.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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as “simply an attempt by private parties to enforce the MDA, claims
308
foreclosed by § 337(a) as construed in Buckman.”
However, after granting a rehearing en banc, the full court
reversed the panel decision and concluded that this “continuing
duty to monitor . . . and report to the FDA” claim was not impliedly
309
preempted.
Describing the plaintiffs’ proposed new state-law
claim in their amended complaint as “specifically . . . a failure to
warn the FDA,” the court concluded that “[i]t is a state-law claim
that is independent of the FDA’s pre-market approval process that
310
was at issue in Buckman.” and thus not impliedly preempted.
In reaching its conclusion that the state-law claim is
311
“independent of” federal requirements for the device, the court
reviewed Buckman and said that the plaintiffs’ claims there were
312
“wholly federal”; that they “alleged no state-law claim and were
313
concerned exclusively with alleged fraud on the FDA.” But this is
obviously not literally correct. The Buckman plaintiffs did allege
state-law claims, alleging that the defendant had committed fraud
when it made certain statements to the FDA in the course of
314
obtaining approval for the device at issue in that case. If no statelaw claims had been alleged in Buckman, the preemption issue
upon which the outcome in the case turned would not have arisen.
In describing the preempted state-law claims in Buckman as “wholly
federal,” perhaps the Stengel court meant that the alleged
wrongdoing in that case arose entirely out of the defendant’s
315
dealings with the FDA.
Similarly, the Stengels’ failure-to-warn
claim arose entirely out of Medtronics’ dealings with, or failure to
deal with by reporting to, the FDA. The court’s explanation thus
fails to distinguish the Stengels’ claims from the preempted claims
in Buckman. However, even if the court’s reasoning in Stengel is
obscure, the result clearly stands for the proposition that state-law
claims are not impliedly preempted unless they are specifically a
308. Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1205–06 (8th Cir. 2010).
309. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
310. Id. at 1233.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1230.
313. Id. at 1230.
314. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 345–46 (2001)
(“Many of these actions include state-law causes of action claiming that petitioner
and AcroMed made fraudulent representations to the FDA . . . .”).
315. See 531 U.S. 341 at 347–48 (“Here, petitioner’s dealings with the FDA
were prompted by the MDA, and the very subject matter of petitioner’s statements
were dictated by that statute’s provisions.”).
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fraud-on-the-FDA claim, a result and reasoning very much in line
316
with that of the Fifth Circuit in Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.
In Globetti v. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corp., a prescription drug
case, a federal district court rejected the defendant’s argument that
the plaintiff’s claims all involved communications with the FDA
317
and, therefore, were preempted under Buckman.
The court
concluded that Buckman was limited to fraud-on-the-FDA claims
alleging “that the federal agency was itself the victim of the fraud”
and did not preclude common law claims for misrepresentation
318
and failure to warn.
As the court explained, “[a]lthough
Buckman precludes a plaintiff from seeking damages because the
defendant lied to the FDA, it is something completely different to
contend that plaintiff is precluded from seeking damages for
319
injuries due to lies to her.”
Those alleged injuries arose from
duties owed to the plaintiff, not the FDA, which existed separate
320
and apart from the requirements of the MDA.
Thus, the court
concluded, the plaintiff could not recover simply because the
defendant may have made misrepresentations to the FDA, but she
could recover for misrepresentations directed to her or her
321
physician.
322
Just as in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Stengel, the Seventh
Circuit in Bausch and the Fifth Circuit in Hughes have interpreted
the preemptive effect of Buckman to be limited strictly to fraud-onthe-FDA claims, and have found plaintiffs’ state-law claims to be
323
traditional tort claims that are “not analogous” to a claim of fraud
on the agency such as those in Buckman and, thus, not impliedly
preempted.
In Bausch, the plaintiff alleged that the injury-causing device
was “adulterated” under federal law and that this violation of
324
federal law was prima facie evidence of negligence.
“Illinois
316. 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011).
317. Globetti v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. CV98-TMP-2649-S, 2001 WL
419160, at *1–2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 2001).
318. Id. at *1.
319. Id.; see also Dawson ex rel. Thompson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 573 (D. N.J. 2001) (concluding that Buckman did not apply to
plaintiff’s common-law fraud claims, which did not allege fraud on the FDA, but
fraud on the public).
320. Globetti, 2001 WL 419160, at *1.
321. Id. at *3.
322. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
323. See Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2011).
324. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2010).
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treats a violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect
human life or property as prima facie evidence of negligence,
though the violation may not always be conclusive on the issue of
325
negligence.”
But the court rejected the defendant’s assertion
that such a claim was impliedly preempted because it was effectively
an effort to enforce federal law, saying that
[w]hile there may not be a “traditional state tort law”
claim for an “adulterated” product in so many words, the
federal definition of adulterated medical devices is tied
directly to the [state-law] duty of manufacturers to avoid
foreseeable dangers with their products by complying with
federal law. The evidence showing a violation of federal
law shows that the device is adulterated and goes a long
way toward showing that the manufacturer breached a
326
duty under state law toward the patient.
327
In Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., the plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of a medical device intended for the treatment of
excess uterine bleeding, alleging, inter alia, that the manufacturer
was negligent per se for violating the FDA safety reporting
328
regulations applicable to the device.
Explaining that
“[n]egligence per se is a legal theory that assists a party to prove
that his adversary was negligent,” the court concluded that the
plaintiff was “not foreclosed by § 360k from arguing . . . that the
doctrine of negligence per se is available to assist her in proving
329
The court rejected the notion that the plaintiff’s
her claim.”
claim was an attempt to exercise the enforcement authority granted
330
exclusively to the FDA and was therefore impliedly preempted.
The court said that the negligence claim was “not analogous” to
331
Buckman’s fraud-on-the-FDA theory.
The plaintiffs in Buckman were attempting to assert a
freestanding federal cause of action based on violation of
the FDA’s regulations; the plaintiffs did not assert
violation of a state tort duty. In contrast, Hughes is
325. Id. at 553.
326. Id. at 557.
327. 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011). The court relied in part on its pre-Riegel
decision, Gomez v. St. Jude Medical Daig Division, Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 933 (5th Cir.
2006), in which it held that negligent manufacturing claims based on violations of
FDA requirements were not impliedly preempted.
328. Id. at 765.
329. Id. at 771.
330. Id. at 775–76.
331. Id. at 775.
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asserting a Mississippi tort claim based on the underlying
state duty to warn about the dangers or risks of [a]
product,
a claim that can be proven by showing a violation of the
332
federal regulations.
Some courts thus find the scope of implied preemption to be
limited to situations strongly analogous to that which gave rise to
333
Buckman itself, that is, claims that are “wholly federal” or “a
334
But as long as some
freestanding federal cause of action.”
335
“traditional state tort law” claim is alleged, even if the conduct
that would allow the plaintiff to prevail under that state-law claim
amounts to fraud-on-the-FDA, that is sufficient to avoid dismissal of
the claim. However, other courts have interpreted the Buckman
holding more expansively to include preemption of state-law claims
336
that, at bottom, “would not exist if the FDCA did not exist” such
as a negligence per se claim in which the allegedly negligent
conduct is conduct that violates a requirement established by
federal law.
XV. THE SCOPE OF IMPLIED PREEMPTION
To the extent that parallel state-law claims incorporate the
same elements as must be shown to demonstrate a violation of
federal law, they either are effectively negligence per se claims or
strongly analogous to a negligence per se claim. Negligence per se
is a doctrine that allows for the incorporation of a statutory or
regulatory requirement as the standard of conduct for non337
negligent behavior.
But use of this doctrine does not convert a
state-law cause of action for negligence into a private federal-law
338
On the other hand, a federal statute may
cause of action.
332. Id.
333. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
335. Bausch v. Stryker, 630 F.3d 546, 557 (7th Cir. 2010).
336. Riley v. Cordis, 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009).
337. See David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation,
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1005–06 (2004) (“In such situations, a court borrows the
specific standard of conduct set forth in the statute, deferring to the legislative
determination of proper behavior, in substitution for the general definition of due
care.”).
338. See Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The
mere fact that the law which evidences negligence is Federal while the negligence
action itself is brought under State common law does not mean that the state law
claim metamorphoses into a private right of action under Federal regulatory
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340

expressly or impliedly provide a private right of action—that is,
a right enforceable by private parties that is created by federal law.
Whether a federal-law cause of action exists by implication is
determined by looking at congressional intent. Negligence per se
and implied cause of action are, therefore, different doctrines, and
this difference suggests a useful analytical basis for distinguishing
between those parallel state-law claims that are impliedly
preempted and those that are not.
One can certainly argue, from the exclusive-federal341
enforcement language of the FDCA itself and from the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Buckman, that the only state-law claims impliedly
preempted are those that amount to a claim of an implied federal
cause of action to enforce a federal requirement arising from the
FDCA. However, Buckman is far from clear and some of the policy
arguments favoring preemption of the plaintiffs’ claims in that case
are equally applicable to some state-law claims that preexisted the
FDCA but have some of the same effects on the FDA’s enforcement
discretion and resources. For example, a plaintiff might allege that
it is negligence per se under state law to fail to report to the FDA
certain information about the safety of a medical device after it has
342
been approved for use.
The success of the plaintiff’s state-law
claim relies on demonstrating that the defendant has violated FDA
reporting requirements and may result in the imposition of money
damages if the negligence per se claim succeeds. Yet the FDA may
simultaneously choose not to pursue the device manufacturer for
those same reporting violations based on a judgment that the
violations resulted from the manufacturer’s mistaken-in-good-faith
interpretations of the requirements, or that it would be
inconsistent with past agency applications or enforcement of the
regulations, or that it would be inappropriate to impose civil
law.”).
339. See, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006), the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Air Act, providing that “any person may commence a civil action in his
own behalf” against any person, including governmental entities, for violations of
the act.
340. See Swanson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690, 705 (Minn. 1985)
(allowing private claim for violation of Consumer Product Safety Commission’s
product hazard reporting regulations).
341. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006); see Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (“Congress has determined that there should be no
private, federal cause of action for the violation [of the FDCA].”).
342. See, for example, Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762, 764 (5th
Cir. 2011), in which the court found such a claim not to be impliedly preempted.
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penalties or other sanctions for the violation. Allowing the statelaw claim to proceed could skew the FDA’s efforts “to achieve a
somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives” and interfere
with the flexibility granted by federal law to the agency that “is a
critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework
under which the FDA pursues difficult (and often competing)
objectives”—two of the concerns that led the Buckman court to
conclude that the claims brought by plaintiffs in that case
sufficiently conflicted with federal objectives so that they were
343
impliedly preempted.
The Supreme Court will ultimately have to attempt to more
clearly resolve the scope of Buckman implied preemption.
XVI. PLAINTIFFS’ PLEADING PROBLEMS
Plaintiffs’ success in these suits has depended in large part on
two factors. The first is whether they have been able to gain access
to documents or other information regarding the premarket
approval process and subsequent data before a dismissal on
preemption grounds cuts off any further discovery. And the
second is whether their pleading of a parallel state claim is made
with sufficient specificity to satisfy the enhanced pleading
344
requirements engendered by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
345
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
The adequacy-of-pleading issue arises typically
when the defendant files a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
346
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In federal
courts, this rule must be interpreted in conjunction with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) which sets out the requirements for
pleading a claim for relief and calls for “a short and plain statement
347
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
To
avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere
conclusory allegations, that are sufficient to “‘nudge[] [his]
348
claims’ . . . ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”
This
means pleading “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” and “raise a right to relief above the

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348–49 (2001).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Or an equivalent state rule of procedure.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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349

speculative level.”
It appears that these pleading requirements
may have had some, though not a dramatic, impact on the
350
outcomes of medical device litigation.
These factors are related,
of course, because the level of specificity possible at the pleading
stage turns in no small part on the amount of discovery that has
been available up to the time that the court rules on the
defendant’s motion to dismiss on preemption grounds.
One problem in these cases for plaintiffs is trying to plead
their claims in a way that avoids preemption and dismissal on the
351
pleadings for that reason. The cases show that it is very typical for
the plaintiff to already have amended their original complaint by
the time the court addresses the preemption issue raised by the
352
defense.
Amendment or further amendment is not always
allowed, especially if the court thinks that even the amended
pleadings would still allege preempted claims so that amendment
353
would be futile. Even when plaintiffs have had the opportunity to
349. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court rejected an argument that its earlier decision in Twombly should be
limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute, such as that
which gave rise to Twombly: “This argument is not supported by Twombly and is
incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly
determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was
based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs
the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (citations omitted).
350. See, e.g., William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and
Medical Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 645 (2011) (some minor effect);
Colleen McNamara, note, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of
District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401, 433–34
(2011).
351. If the claim pleaded is preempted, it would ordinarily be dismissed
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
352. See, e.g., Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff
had amended complaint once and sought leave to file second amended
complaint, a motion denied by trial court); Hughes v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 631
F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff filed amended complaint after defendant’s
removal of case to federal district court); Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d
145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (court had previously granted defendant’s motion to
dismiss with leave to amend; plaintiff filed amended complaint); Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint, Bass v. Stryker Corp., No. 4:09–CV–632–Y, 2010 WL 3431637
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2010), 2009 WL 6354479.
353. See, e.g., Gross v. Stryker Corp., 858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 505 (W.D. Pa. 2012)
(“In this Court’s estimation, leave to amend is not required because any
amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint would be futile. Plaintiff’s strict liability
claims against [Defendant] are not viable under Pennsylvania law. He has not set
forth any facts supporting a breach of express warranty claim. Finally, his
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amend their pleadings, that is sometimes not enough to save the
354
case from dismissal.
Another problem for plaintiffs arises when their allegations are
challenged as lacking the specificity necessary to avoid dismissal
under the enhanced pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.
A plaintiff may try to avoid dismissal by arguing that he does not
have enough information to be any more specific and needs
355
discovery to develop that information.
The courts vary in their
remaining claims are expressly preempted, do not meet the narrow exception of
parallel claims, or are conceded. For these reasons, the Court declines to grant
Plaintiff the opportunity to amend.”); Reeves v. PharmaJet, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d
791, 798–99 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“Moreover, the Court finds that granting a motion
to amend the Complaint would be futile in this instance because the essence of
Plaintiff’s current claim is an alleged violation of the FDCA for which there is no
private cause of action. Moreover, the new potential claims suggested by Plaintiff
involving negligent misrepresentation or fraud would fail for the same reason and
there is also the problem that Plaintiff did not and cannot allege that [Defendant]
made any misrepresentations to the Plaintiff, thus preventing the establishment of
either potential new claim.”). But see Leonard v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–
03787–JEC, 2011 WL 3652311, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2011) (“Plaintiffs make
several new factual allegations in their response related to Leonard’s injuries and
death which are not in the original complaint. These allegations relate to
plaintiffs’ ability to state a valid claim for relief and to the timeliness issue.
Further, the complaint was filed several months before the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Wolicki-Gables, which set the parameters for a valid parallel claim under
Riegel. In the interests of justice, the Court will grant plaintiffs leave to amend
their complaint.”).
354. See, e.g., Funk, 631 F.3d at 779 (plaintiff amended complaint once, sought
leave to file second amended complaint but motion denied by trial court; dismissal
based on first amended complaint affirmed on appeal); Loreto v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 737 F. Supp. 2d 909, 924 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“Because Plaintiffs had
the opportunity to amend their Complaints after having notice of [defendant]’s
position, and because such amendment failed to cure any pleading deficiencies,
another amendment is not warranted.”). But see Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d
501, 510 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Bass has sufficiently pleaded parallel claims in his first
amended complaint, to the extent that the claims are based upon manufacturing
defects resulting from violations of federal regulations.”).
355. See, e.g., Sprint Fidelis Leads II, 623 F.3d 1200, 1206–07 (8th Cir. 2010)
(“On appeal, Plaintiffs primarily argue that the district court’s application of
Twombly in this case held them to an impossible pleading standard because the
FDA’s specific federal manufacturing requirements are set forth in the agency’s
PMA approval files that are accessible, without discovery, only to Medtronic and to
the FDA. This argument—which focuses on the timing of the preemption
ruling—would have considerable force in a case where a specific defective Class III
device injured a consumer, and the plaintiff did not have access to the specific
federal requirements in the PMA prior to commencing the lawsuit. Compare
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009) (while plaintiffs
‘must offer sufficient factual allegations to show that he or she is not merely
engaged in a fishing expedition or strike suit, we must also take account of their
limited access to crucial information.’)” (footnote omitted)).
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reactions. Some deny the plaintiff’s motion to allow more
discovery, concluding that it would not alter the eventual
356
outcome.
Others allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery—in
practice, that alone increases the plaintiff’s settlement leverage—so
that they may obtain (assuming it is there to discover) the further
information needed for a detailed statement of the specific bases
357
for the claim.
If discovery is unlikely to provide the information necessary to
make a plaintiff’s allegations more specific, then there is not an
adequate reason to allow the plaintiff to proceed any further. But
courts should deny a motion to dismiss on the pleadings and allow
for at least some discovery if the information necessary to craft
pleadings with sufficient specificity is otherwise beyond the reach of
the plaintiff and likely to be discovered. The preemption issue can
then be decided in the context of a motion for summary judgment.
XVII. CONCLUSION
The precise contours of the narrow gap through which a
plaintiff bringing a product defect claim against a medical device
manufacturer must sail in order to avoid having her claims
preempted are not yet clear. The plaintiff’s state-law claims must
not impose on the manufacturer requirements that are different
from, or in addition to, those imposed by the FDCA and its

356. See, e.g., Gross, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (“No discovery is necessary here
because, even after discovery, Plaintiff would still not be able to allege any viable
claims against Stryker. In fact, numerous district courts across the country have
dismissed very similar actions in their entirety at the motion to dismiss stage.”);
Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., No. CV 10–318–TUC–RCC, 2010 WL 4483970, at *3 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d, 676 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]dditional discovery is
futile because Plaintiff’s claims are preempted and additional discovery will not
remedy that.”).
357. See, e.g., Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010)
(District court’s refusal to allow amendment of pleadings reversed as abuse of
discretion: “In applying that standard to claims for defective manufacture of a
medical device in violation of federal law, moreover, district courts must keep in
mind that much of the product-specific information about manufacturing needed
to investigate such a claim fully is kept confidential by federal law. Formal
discovery is necessary before a plaintiff can fairly be expected to provide a detailed
statement of the specific bases for her claim.”); Warren v. Howmedica Osteonics
Corp., No. 4:10 CV 1346 DDN, 2010 WL 5093097, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2010)
(“[P]laintiffs are entitled to proceed with their suit and obtain information
through discovery.”); Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 830,
838 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“With discovery, [plaintiff] may or may not be able to prove
[his] claims . . . .”).
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implementing regulations, or the claim is expressly preempted by
the MDA. Instead, the requirements that state law imposes on the
manufacturer must simply parallel the requirements imposed by
federal law. There are two key issues to be resolved in the express
preemption cases. The first is just how specific the applicable
federal law must be in order to be regarded as a requirement of
federal law. The second is how to determine whether the state-law
claim merely parallels a federal law requirement.
As to the first question, the courts should determine whether
there is a federal requirement found either in the FDCA or its
implementing regulations that clearly applies to the medical device
at issue. The requirement need not be device-specific but must
clearly apply either to all devices of that category or to all medical
devices. This is a question of law that should be resolved by the
court, not a question that should be left to the factfinder. The
factfinder’s role is to then determine whether the defendant has or
has not complied with that requirement. But if the applicability of
the alleged federal “requirement” is not clear, then a jury should
not be left to decide whether federal law could be interpreted to
apply. The court should first determine whether there is a legal
requirement and leave to the factfinder only the question of
whether that law has been violated. And as to deciding the second
question, courts should look carefully at the elements of both the
federal and state law claims to see whether the elements necessary
to prove a violation of federal law are the same as the elements
necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, to prove the state-law
claim. If so, the state-law claim merely parallels the federal-law
claim and is not expressly preempted by the MDA.
Then, to determine whether a parallel state law claim is
impliedly preempted, the courts must confront and resolve the
question of Buckman’s scope. Is it limited only to claims of a
violation of the FDCA with no underlying preexisting state-law
cause of action? Or are even traditional state-law claims, such as
negligence per se claims, preempted because they would not exist
in the absence of a requirement established by federal law, the
enforcement of which should be the exclusive province of the
FDA?
If the Supreme Court’s primary rationale for finding
preemption in Buckman is that the FDCA does not create a private
federal cause of action for enforcement of the act, then lower
federal courts should distinguish between plaintiffs’ claims that
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amount simply to a claim of an implied federal cause of action to
enforce a federal requirement arising from the FDCA and state-law
causes of action, such as negligence per se, in which a standard of
conduct established by federal law is simply incorporated into the
state-law claim, and not find preemption only in the latter kind of
cases.
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